Conventionalist ethical relativism posits that moral truths are not universal or objective, but rather are defined by the customs and agreements of a particular society. This view, often contrasted with moral objectivism and individual subjectivism, suggests that what is considered "right" or "wrong" is a product of social consensus, evolving with cultural norms and historical context. Rather than discovering pre-existing moral laws, proponents argue, societies construct their moral frameworks through shared understandings and practices. This essay will argue that while conventionalist ethical relativism offers a compelling explanation for the diversity of moral practices across cultures and throughout history, its reliance on social agreement presents significant challenges in adjudicating between conflicting moral systems and in accounting for moral progress.
The strength of conventionalism lies in its ability to explain the observed variability of moral codes. Consider the practice of polygamy. In many Western societies, it is viewed as morally reprehensible, while in others, such as parts of the Islamic world or historical Mormon communities, it has been, or still is, accepted. A conventionalist perspective would simply state that in the former societies, the social convention dictates that marriage is monogamous, thus making polygamy morally wrong within that framework. Conversely, in societies where polygamy is a recognized norm, it is considered morally permissible. Anthropological studies, such as those detailing the differing views on honor killings across various cultures, further illustrate this point. What is a grave moral offense in one society might be seen as a necessary, albeit tragic, upholding of familial honor in another. These variations are not seen as deviations from a single true morality, but as legitimate expressions of distinct social contracts.
Furthermore, conventionalism provides a framework for understanding how moral beliefs change over time within a single society. The abolition of slavery in the United States serves as a prime example. For centuries, slavery was not only legally sanctioned but also widely accepted as morally justifiable by a significant portion of the population. Its eventual abolition, driven by abolitionist movements and evolving societal attitudes, demonstrates a shift in the prevailing social convention regarding human ownership. A conventionalist would interpret this not as humanity finally discovering an objective truth about the inherent wrongness of slavery, but as a society renegotiating its moral contract, leading to a new consensus. Similarly, the changing attitudes towards women's suffrage and LGBTQ+ rights reflect the dynamic nature of social conventions that define moral boundaries.
However, the conventionalist position faces substantial difficulties when confronted with inter-societal moral judgments and the possibility of genuine moral progress. If morality is solely a matter of social agreement, then it becomes problematic to condemn the practices of other societies, even those that appear to us as deeply unjust or harmful. For instance, how can a conventionalist logically argue against the deeply entrenched caste system in historical India or the atrocities of the Nazi regime without appealing to some external, objective moral standard? The conventionalist might argue that a society can critique its own past or present conventions, as seen with the abolition of slavery. But when a society's conventions clash with those of another, the conventionalist framework offers no impartial arbiter. It risks reducing all moral claims to matters of cultural preference, leaving no room for universal human rights or the idea that some cultural practices are simply wrong, regardless of prevailing opinion.
Moreover, the concept of moral progress becomes ambiguous under conventionalism. If a society shifts from one set of conventions to another, is it necessarily progressing? The abolition of slavery, for example, is widely considered a moral advancement. Yet, if morality is merely a reflection of current social agreement, then the shift from accepting slavery to rejecting it is simply a change in convention, not necessarily an improvement in moral understanding. This can lead to a relativistic impasse where no society's moral framework can be deemed superior to another's, hindering the aspiration for a more just and ethical world. This essay contends that while conventionalist ethical relativism accurately describes the social construction of many moral norms, its inability to provide a basis for cross-cultural moral critique or robust notions of moral progress limits its adequacy as a complete ethical theory.