The question of whether morality is objective or subjective has preoccupied philosophers for centuries. Two prominent theories addressing this are ethical subjectivism and ethical relativism. While both challenge the notion of universal moral truths, they diverge significantly in their foundational assumptions and implications. Ethical subjectivism posits that moral judgments are mere expressions of individual feelings or attitudes, making morality entirely personal. In contrast, ethical relativism argues that moral standards are determined by cultural or societal norms, implying that right and wrong can vary between groups. This essay will argue that while ethical subjectivism offers a compelling account of individual moral experience, ethical relativism provides a more robust framework for understanding societal moral diversity, though both face significant challenges in establishing a stable ground for ethical evaluation.
Ethical subjectivism, in its purest form, reduces morality to personal preference. A subjectivist might claim that stating "charity is good" simply means "I approve of charity." There is no independent moral fact of the matter that makes charity good. This view aligns with our intuition that people can genuinely disagree on moral issues, and that sometimes these disagreements reflect deeply held personal values rather than factual disputes. For instance, consider the issue of animal testing. A subjectivist might analyze a proponent's view as "I feel it is acceptable for scientific advancement" and an opponent's view as "I feel it is cruel and inhumane." The disagreement, from this perspective, is not about a shared, discoverable moral truth, but about the differing emotional responses and personal values of the individuals involved. This makes moral discourse appear more like an exchange of opinions or feelings than a reasoned debate aimed at uncovering objective truth. While this perspective can explain the diversity of moral opinions, it struggles to account for the force of moral obligation or the possibility of genuine moral progress. If morality is just personal preference, why should anyone feel obligated to act against their immediate desires for the sake of a moral principle? Furthermore, how can society condemn past practices like slavery as morally wrong if morality is purely subjective?
Ethical relativism, on the other hand, grounds morality in the practices and beliefs of a particular society or culture. It suggests that what is considered right or wrong is relative to the cultural context in which the judgment is made. For example, attitudes towards polygamy vary dramatically across cultures. In some societies, it is a widely accepted and legally sanctioned practice, reflecting a different set of cultural norms and values than those prevalent in Western societies where monogamy is the norm. A relativist would argue that neither cultural practice is objectively superior; they are simply different expressions of differing societal moral codes. This approach offers a powerful explanation for the vast diversity of moral practices observed throughout history and across different cultures. It encourages tolerance and understanding by suggesting that we should not impose our own cultural moral standards on others. However, ethical relativism faces its own set of problems. If morality is solely determined by cultural norms, then it becomes impossible to criticize the moral practices of any culture, including one's own. This would mean that a society could not condemn practices like genocide or the oppression of minorities if those practices were accepted within its cultural framework. The concept of moral reform or progress also becomes problematic; how can a society advocate for change if its current norms are by definition morally correct within that context?
The tension between these two theories highlights the difficulty in reconciling individual moral experience with the observed diversity of moral beliefs. Subjectivism captures the personal, felt dimension of morality but risks dissolving ethical obligation and progress. Relativism accounts for cultural variation but struggles with the possibility of cross-cultural moral critique and reform. Perhaps a more nuanced understanding is needed, one that acknowledges the subjective element in individual moral convictions while also recognizing that some moral principles, like the prohibition of gratuitous harm, may have a wider applicability than pure relativism allows. Nevertheless, both ethical subjectivism and ethical relativism serve as crucial critiques of absolutist moral theories, forcing us to think critically about the origins and nature of our moral judgments.