Moral subjectivism, the view that moral judgments are expressions of individual attitudes or feelings rather than objective truths, presents a significant challenge to traditional ethical frameworks. If morality is purely subjective, then concepts like universal human rights, moral obligation, and even the possibility of genuine ethical disagreement seem to crumble. This essay will argue that while moral subjectivism acknowledges the personal dimension of morality, its radical implications for objectivity and shared ethical understanding render it an inadequate foundation for a robust ethical system.
One of the primary appeals of moral subjectivism lies in its acknowledgment of the diverse moral intuitions and cultural norms that exist across different individuals and societies. Proponents might point to the historical shifts in moral attitudes, such as the abolition of slavery or the changing perceptions of gender equality, as evidence that morality is not fixed but rather a product of evolving human sentiment. For instance, what was considered morally acceptable in 17th-century Europe – the widespread acceptance of colonialism and its accompanying atrocities – is now widely condemned. This suggests that moral truths are not discovered, like scientific laws, but are rather constructed based on prevailing sentiments and values. A subjectivist might argue that the "wrongness" of slavery is not an inherent property of the act itself, but a reflection of our modern collective disapproval.
However, this emphasis on individual feeling or collective sentiment creates a problem for the very notion of ethical progress or critique. If morality is merely a matter of personal taste, then how can we meaningfully condemn the actions of another person or culture? The subjectivist might respond that we are simply expressing our own disapproval, not making an objective claim about their actions. Yet, this leaves us unable to challenge deeply ingrained or harmful moral beliefs, such as those underpinning genocides or systemic discrimination. For example, if a society genuinely believes, based on its subjective moral framework, that a particular ethnic group is inferior and deserving of persecution, a subjectivist would struggle to offer an ethical argument against such a belief, other than to say, "I personally find that abhorrent." This inability to engage in meaningful ethical critique undermines the aspirational aspect of ethics, which often involves striving for a better, more just world.
Furthermore, moral subjectivism struggles to account for the apparent universality of certain moral intuitions. While moral practices may vary, certain core principles, such as prohibitions against gratuitous harm to innocents or the value placed on honesty in interpersonal dealings, appear to be shared across a vast array of cultures. Philosophers like Immanuel Kant, with his concept of the categorical imperative, sought to establish universalizable moral laws that would apply to all rational beings. While Kant's specific formulation might be debated, the intuition that some moral rules possess a broader validity than mere personal preference persists. The subjectivist view struggles to explain why so many people, regardless of their background, feel a strong, almost instinctual revulsion towards acts like torture or the deliberate infliction of suffering on children. If morality is purely subjective, these shared feelings become a remarkable coincidence rather than evidence of something more.
The implications of moral subjectivism for ethical discourse are also problematic. If moral statements are simply expressions of feeling, then genuine disagreement becomes impossible. When two individuals disagree about whether abortion is morally permissible, a subjectivist would claim they are not truly disagreeing about a fact, but rather expressing conflicting emotional responses. This reduces ethical debates to mere expressions of preference, stripping them of the argumentative rigor and pursuit of truth that characterize philosophical inquiry. This can lead to moral relativism, where all moral stances are considered equally valid, preventing any possibility of reasoned persuasion or the establishment of common ethical ground. The ability to reason about morality, to present arguments and counter-arguments, and to aim for consensus is central to how we understand ethics as a discipline and a practice.
In conclusion, while moral subjectivism offers a plausible explanation for the diversity of moral beliefs and the personal nature of moral experience, its foundational tenets prove insufficient for a comprehensive ethical system. By reducing morality to mere individual attitudes, it undermines the possibility of objective ethical critique, fails to account for shared moral intuitions, and renders meaningful ethical discourse impossible. A more robust ethical framework must acknowledge the subjective element without abandoning the pursuit of shared, reasoned moral understanding and the aspiration towards universal ethical principles.