Plato's Meno presents a compelling dialogue between Socrates and the young Thessalian nobleman Meno, primarily concerned with the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught. Meno, initially confident, finds himself unable to define virtue, prompting Socrates to explore its essence. Through their exchange, the dialogue shifts from a straightforward inquiry into virtue to a profound examination of knowledge itself, culminating in Socrates' theory of recollection. This essay argues that Meno ultimately suggests virtue is not a teachable skill in the conventional sense, but rather a form of divine dispensation or correct opinion, attainable through a process of internal retrieval of forgotten knowledge, thereby challenging conventional understandings of learning and ethical development.
Meno initially offers several definitions of virtue, each based on a specific role or action: virtue for a man is managing public affairs, for a woman managing a household, and so on. Socrates dismisses these as defining types of virtue, not virtue itself, likening it to asking for the color of a crowd rather than its essence. He pushes Meno to consider virtue as a single entity. Meno then proposes that virtue is the desire for good things and the ability to acquire them. Socrates agrees that desiring good things is indeed virtuous, but questions the second part: can one acquire good things without possessing virtue? He posits that if one incorrectly desires bad things (believing them to be good), they might acquire them, leading to harm. Thus, true virtue requires not just the desire but the correct understanding of what is good. This leads to the core problem: if virtue is knowledge, can it be taught?
Socrates observes that while many claim to teach virtue, including the Sophists, there are no recognized teachers, nor does it seem to pass from father to son. He uses the example of Pericles, a great Athenian statesman, whose sons were not considered virtuous. This suggests that virtue is not acquired through instruction or lineage. Meno then introduces the paradox of inquiry: how can one search for something if they do not know what it is, and if they do know, why search? Socrates resolves this by positing the theory of recollection. He draws a slave boy into the conversation and, through geometrical questioning, demonstrates that the boy can arrive at correct answers about a geometrical problem without prior instruction. Socrates argues that this knowledge was not learned but was already present within the boy, waiting to be "recollected" from a past existence. This implies that all learning is a form of remembering, and therefore, virtue, if it is knowledge, is also something already possessed, not externally imparted.
The implications of this theory are significant. If virtue is knowledge, and knowledge is recollection, then virtue is not something that can be strictly taught by an external agent like a Sophist. Instead, it arises from an individual's inner capacity, perhaps divinely given. Socrates distinguishes between true knowledge (episteme) and correct opinion (orthē doxa). While the slave boy achieved correct opinions through Socratic questioning, these opinions are like unanchored statues – valuable but liable to be lost without the "tether" of understanding why they are true. True virtue, then, might be understood as an innate disposition or a divinely inspired correct opinion that guides one towards good actions, rather than a learned skill. Socrates concludes that while virtue can be attained, its origin is not in human teaching but in a higher source, making it more akin to a gift or a fortunate state of being rather than a product of pedagogical effort. The dialogue leaves the precise nature of virtue somewhat elusive, but firmly establishes that its acquisition is a complex internal process, not a simple educational transaction.