The existence of pervasive suffering and moral evil in the world presents one of philosophy of religion's most enduring and vexing problems. The core of this difficulty lies in reconciling this observable reality with the traditional theological attributes of God: omnipotence (all-powerful), omniscience (all-knowing), and omnibenevolence (all-good). If God is all-good, He would want to eliminate evil. If He is all-powerful, He could eliminate evil. If He is all-knowing, He would know how to eliminate evil. Yet, evil clearly persists. This essay will argue that while the logical problem of evil, which posits a strict contradiction between God's nature and the existence of evil, is difficult to overcome, the evidential problem of evil, which suggests that the amount and types of suffering make God's existence improbable, offers more avenues for theological response and defense.
The logical problem of evil, most famously articulated by Epicurus and later refined by philosophers like J.L. Mackie, presents a stark incompatibility. Mackie, in his 1955 article, argued that the following four propositions cannot all be true: "1. God is omnipotent. 2. God is wholly good. 3. Evil exists. 4. A wholly good, omnipotent being would prevent all evils." The argument suggests that if God is omnipotent, He has the power to prevent evil; if He is wholly good, He desires to prevent evil; therefore, if both are true, evil should not exist. The existence of evil, even in a single instance, is seen as refuting the co-existence of these divine attributes. Some responses to this logical problem, like the Free Will Defense, argue that God permits evil as a necessary consequence of granting humans free will. This defense, however, faces challenges: could an omnipotent God not create beings with free will who always choose good? Furthermore, this defense struggles to account for natural evils, such as earthquakes and diseases, which do not seem to stem from human choices.
The evidential problem of evil, conversely, does not claim a strict logical contradiction but argues that the sheer scale and gratuitousness of suffering in the world make the existence of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God highly improbable. Philosophers like William Rowe have highlighted instances of intense suffering, such as the agony of a fawn trapped and burning in a forest fire, which seem to serve no greater purpose. Such suffering, it is argued, is simply too much, too horrific, and too seemingly pointless to be compatible with a loving, all-powerful creator. This perspective shifts the burden of proof, requiring the theist to demonstrate why such suffering might be permissible or even necessary from a divine perspective. Responses here often involve appeal to inscrutable divine plans or the concept of soul-making theodicies, popularized by John Hick.
The soul-making theodicy suggests that the world is not designed as a paradise but as a spiritual gymnasium, a place where individuals can develop character, virtue, and moral maturity through overcoming challenges and suffering. In this view, suffering is not gratuitous but instrumental in the development of beings capable of having a genuine relationship with God. God, in this framework, is not seen as wishing to minimize suffering but as desiring the development of a certain kind of humanity. This perspective accounts for both moral and natural evils, framing them as conditions that allow for the cultivation of courage, compassion, and resilience. However, critics question whether the immense suffering endured by some individuals is truly necessary for this development, or if it constitutes an excessive price for character building.
Ultimately, the problem of evil remains a profound challenge for religious belief. While the logical problem of evil presents a formidable case for incompatibility, the evidential problem allows for more nuanced theological responses. Theodicy, the attempt to justify God's ways in the face of suffering, offers various explanations, from free will to soul-making. Yet, no single theodicy has universally satisfied all objectors. The persistent existence of seemingly gratuitous suffering continues to fuel skepticism. However, for believers, faith often involves trusting in a divine purpose that transcends human comprehension, acknowledging the mystery of suffering while maintaining belief in a good and powerful God.